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CASE - COMMENTS

CASE COMMENTS
ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION IN TORT ACTIONS
"[F]rom the very inception of the federal judiciary to the present,
federal courts have taken jurisdiction (without reference to amount
in controversy, diversity of citizenship, or the presence of any other
'federal question') of all causes of action arising under maritime law." 1
Admiralty has developed its own criteria for jurisdiction: in contracts
jurisdiction depends on subject matter; in tort jurisdiction depends on
locality.2 The Plymouth3 set forth the locality test in the broadest
terms: "Every species of tort, however occurring, and whether on
board a vessel or not, if upon the high seas or navigable waters, is of
admiralty cognizance." 4 But the precise scope of admiralty jurisdiction is not a matter of "obvious principle or of very accurate history," and it has frequently been questioned whether locality is the
exclusive test of jurisdiction in tort actions or whether the tort must also
be of a maritime character.6 The exclusiveness of the locality test has
never been determined by the Supreme Court,7 and the test continues
to be questioned and attacked.
The locality test is frequently criticized in cases in which the tort
occurs upon navigable waters but does not involve a vessel and has no
relation to the maritime industry." Such a situation was presented in
Thomson v. Chesapeake Yacht Club, Inc.9 when libelant fell into
navigable waters through a hole in respondent's pier. The court held
that the locality test controlled but denied admiralty jurisdiction because the negligent act or omission became operative on libelant while
'Slaughter, Basic Principles of Admiralty, 19 Ark. L. Rev. 93, 95 (1965).

2

"The general doctrine that in contract matters, admiralty jurisdiction depends
upon the nature of the transaction and in tort matters upon the locality, has
been so frequently asserted by this court that it must now be treated as settled."
Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Kierejewski, 261 U.S. 479, 480 (1923).
3
Hough v. The Western Transp. Co. (The Plymouth), 70 US. (3 Wall.) 20
(1865).

41d. at 36.

uThe Blackheath, 195 U.S. 361, 365 (1904).
6
E.g., Atlantic Transp. Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52 (1914).
7"No definitive judicial determination was ever made as to whether locality was

the sole and exclusive test, or whether the maritime character of the -particular
tortious act was likewise a relevant jurisdictional consideration." Note, 60 Mich.
L. Rev. 208, 209 (1961).
8E.g., McGuire v. City of New York, 192 F. Supp. 866 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
OAdmiralty No. 4820, D. Md., Oct. 26, 1965. It should be noted that under the
saving to suitors clause, § 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 76, 79 (1789),

as codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1948), libelant could have proceeded as an
ordinary tort plaintiff in the Maryland court system.
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he was still on land even though libelant suffered no injury until
he struck the navigable waters. The court stated that the tort was complete before libelant touched the water and the subsequent injury
related only to the extent of damages and was not significant in determining whether this action was of a maritime nature.10 If locality is the
exclusive test of admiralty jurisdiction in tort actions, Thomson was
within the admiralty jurisdiction.
The fact that the tort in Thomson did not involve a vessel has no
bearing on the locality test.' Admiralty jurisdiction has been upheld
14
in cases involving water skiers,12 bathers,' 3 and aircraft passengers
1
despite the fact that no vessel was involved.
The crucial requirement of the locality test is that "the wrong and
injury . . . or at least, the substance and consummation of the same
must have taken place wholly upon . .. [navigable] waters." 16 Ad7
miralty has long held that when the necessary elements of the tort'
occur partly on land and partly on navigable waters, the place of the
injury constitutes the "substance and consummation" of the tort.' s
In McDonald v. Cape Cod Trawling Corp.19 a lamppost fell from
the wharf and struck a seaman aboard a vessel. The court upheld
admiralty jurisdiction stating that "this is a commonplace illustration of
the familiar general conflict of laws rule that the place of wrong is
the place where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for
lOThonson was quoting directly from Wiper v. Great Lakes Eng'r Works, 340
F.2d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 1965).

11"The jurisdiction of admiralty over maritime torts does not depend upon the
wrong
having been committed on board the vessel . .. ." Supra note 3, at 35.
2
1 King v. Testerman, 214 F. Supp. 335 (E.D. Tenn. 1963).

' 3Reinhardt v. Newport Flying Serv. Corp, 232 N.Y. 115, 133 N.E. 371
(1921). It should be noted that in Reinhardt the court was primarily concerned
with whether a seaplane was a vessel and did not question the status of the
bather. But cf. McGuire v. City of New York, supranote 8.
34 Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 316 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1963); Wilson v.
Transocean Airlines, 121 F. Supp. 85 (N.D. Cal. 1959).

'SAdmiralty jurisdiction has also been upheld in cases which involve "things"
not technically considered "vessels," e.g., drydocks, United States v. Bruce Dry
Dock Co., 65 F.2d 938 (5th Cir. 1933); and incomplete vessels, Grant Smith-Porter
Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469 (1922); Note, 4 Texas L. Rev. 306, 310 (1926).
bsSupra note 3, at 35.

17The necessary elements of the tort of negligence are: (1) duty violation;
(2) causal connection between duty-violating conduct and the resulting injury;
(3) actual loss or damage. Proof of damages is thus an essential part of plaintiff's
case. Prosser, Torts S 30 (3d ed. 1964).
18Rundall v. La Campagnie Generale Transadantique, 100 Fed. 655, 657
(7th Cir. 1900).

1971 F. Supp. 888 (D. Mass. 1947).
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an alleged tort occurs." 20 Without injury there is no tort of negligence but only "damnum absque injuria," 21 and it is "clear that the
locality of the thing to be considered is that of the thing injured, and
not of the agent causing the injury .. ," 22
In The City of Lincoln23 and in Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. City of
ilonterey24 respondents' wharves collapsed and libelants' goods were
thrown into navigable waters. The courts held, directly contrary to
Thomson, that "the injury to libelant's steel-booms was effected
wholly in the water, into which they were thrown through the breaking down of the wharf. The whole 'substance and consummation of
the injury' were . . . in the water. It was the water that did the
damage. That was the place of the damage and consequently the place
of the tort, for the purpose of jurisdiction." 25 Admiralty jurisdiction
has also been upheld when faulty repairs or maintenance on land caused
an aircraft to crash at sea. If there is no impact upon the person or
property before striking the water "it is recognized that the tort occurs upon the water within the admiralty jurisdiction." 2 0
The language of The Plymouth in establishing the locality test was
certainly broad, yet it provided a single and precise criterion for determining admiralty jurisdiction in tort actions.2 7 The majority of
courts have maintained that locality is still the exclusive test for determining admiralty jurisdiction in tort actions2 s and that jurisdiction is
not affected by the character or extent of the tort, or by the relations of the persons injured.2 Thus Thomson should be within
admiralty jurisdiction because it meets the sole requirement of the
locality test that the tort be consummated on navigable waters.
But there has always been some doubt whether locality was merely
2

01d. at 890.

21
Hermann
22

v. Port Blakely Mill Co., 69 Fed. 646, 651 (N.D. Cal. 1895).
Smith v. Lampe, 64 F.2d 201, 202 (6th Cir. 1933); Dorrington v. City of

Detroit, 223 Fed. 232, 242 (6th Cir. 1915). "It has long been established law

that, if a person on the high seas is killed by a shot fired by a person on shore,
the offense is committed on the high seas." Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. City of
Monterey, 6 F.2d 893, 894-95 (N.D. Cal. 1925).
225 Fed. 835 (S.D.N.Y. 1885).

246 F.2d 893 (N.D. Cal. 1925).
25Supra note 23, at 837 (Emphasis added.)
20
Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, supra note 14, at 92.
27

When the locality test "was announced, it was believed both by the courts
and by the profession that a single test for tort jurisdiction had been established."
Note,
75 U. Pa. L. Rev. 655 (1927).
28
"[T]he weight of authority is clearly to the effect that locality alone
determines whether or not a tort claim is within admiralty jurisdiction."
Weinstein
v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., supra note 14, at 763.
29
The Highland Light, 12 Fed. Cas. 138 (No. 6477) (C.C.D. Md. 1867).
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one of the tests for determining admiralty jurisdiction or the sole
test. The most famous of these is "Mr. Benedict's celebrated doubt"
which questions whether admiralty jurisdiction would extend to an
assault between two bathers, which obviously does not involve a
vessel and has no relation to the maritime industry 30
The doubts about the locality test were created, not by any ambiguity in The Plymouth, but by the terminology and holdings of subsequent cases. The first cases to cast doubt on the locality test involved
ship-to-shore injuries, termed "amphibious torts."'1 For 40 years
after The Plymouth "admiralty denied jurisdiction where damage
was done by a ship to any object fixed to land." 32 Then The Blackheath33 extended admiralty jurisdiction to cover a collision between a
vessel and a beacon surrounded by navigable waters but attached to
land. 34 The Blackheath held that although the beacon was attached
to land its purpose was to serve as an "aid to navigation"; therefore it was within admiralty jurisdiction. Justice Brown, concurring,
stated that this extension of admiralty jurisdiction to cover structures
affixed to land overruled The Plymouth and the locality test and that
"to attempt to draw the line of jurisdiction between different kinds
of fixed structures, as, for instance, between beacons and wharves,
would lead to great confusion and much further litigation." 3 5 In subsequent cases The Blackheath was held not to overrule the locality test
but to create a minor exception to it. Locality was still the test for admiralty jurisdiction in tort actions with the exception that if the structure was an "aid to navigation" admiralty had jurisdiction regardless of
the fact that the structure was attached to land.36 However, Justice
Brown's prediction of confusion and unnecessary litigation was borne
out,3 7 and the courts became involved in a long line of cases which
3

- OlBenedict, Admiralty 351 (6th ed. 1940).

3SJurisdiction over ship-to-shore injuries was regulated by the Extension of
Admiralty Act, which extended admiralty jurisdiction to all torts "caused by a
vessel on navigable waters." 62 Stat. 496, 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1948). However, since
the Act was concerned only with vessel-caused injury, it did not affect the
situation in Thomson, which involved a shore-to-water injury in no way related
to any vessel.
3"Supra note 27.
33Supra note 5.

34The beacon "was built on piles driven firmly into the bottom. There is no
question that it was . . . part of [the realty] .... " Supra note 5, at 364. But
see Doullut & Williams, Inc. v. United States, 268 U.S. 33, 34 (1925).

35Supra note 5, at 369.
36
Gilmore & Black, Admiralty 432 (1957); 1 Benedict § 129 (6th ed. 1940);
Note, 60 Mich. L. Rev. 208 (1962). See The Barbara Cates, 8 F. Supp. 470
(E.D.
Pa. 1934); The Senator, 54 F.2d 420 (D. Del. 1931).
37

There has been much confusion and litigation over the difficulty of differ-
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attempted to distinguish a land structure from an "aid to navigation."
The questionableness of some of these distinctions is exemplified by
the cable cases in which submarine cables used for communication
were deemed "aids to navigation" and held to be within admiralty
jurisdiction 8 while cables used solely to carry electric current were
deemed land structures and not within admiralty jurisdiction.3 9
In all of the cases involving an "aid to navigation" attached to
land, the court looked beyond the locality of the structure and sought
to ascertain the purpose of the structure. Such consideration of
purpose, aside from locality, led to direct attacks on the exclusiveness
of the locality test. Atlantic Transp. Co. v. Imbrovek4" questioned
whether locality was the sole test of admiralty jurisdiction in tort
actions or whether the basis for "all admiralty jurisdiction, whether
in contract or in tort, is the maritime nature of the transaction or
event . . . . ,41 The petitioner contended that the locality test is not
exclusive and "that in every adjudicated case in this country in which
the jurisdiction of admiralty with respect to torts has been sustained,
the tort apart from the mere place of its occurrence, has been of a
maritime character." 42 Imbrovek gave no decision on the locality
test because "in the present case the wrong which was the subject
of the suit was, we think, of a maritime nature, and hence the District
Court, from any point of view, had jurisdiction."

4

Imbrovek furnished impetus to those attacking the locality test as
arbitrary, wholly irrational, bearing no relation to the purpose of
admiralty jurisdiction, and a blind following of history. 4 The "reasoning" behind the locality test is said to be exemplified by the
quaint statement of the respondent in The Plymouth that once "we
broke the Constitution by discarding the limit of tidewater and the
sovereign arbitrament of the moon" we must now hold to the hisentiating between objects or structures which take their character from the land
to which they are in some way connected and those which are deemed so related
to navigation as to become subjects of maritime jurisdiction. Farnum, Admiralty
Jurisdiction
and Amphibious Torts, 43 Yale L.J. 34, 39 (1934).
3

sPostal Tel. Cable Co. v. P. Sanford Ross, Inc., 221 Fed. 105 (E.D.N.Y. 1915).
39Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha v. Great W. Power Co., 17 F.2d 239

(9th
Cir. 1927).
4

oSupra note 6.
1d. at 61.

41

421d.at 60.
431d. at 61.
44

Black, Admiralty Jurisdiction: Critique And Suggestions, 50 Colum. L. Rev.
259, 264 (1950); Ryan, The Amphibious Tort Problems, 13 Brooklyn L. Rev. 129
(1947); Bruncken, Tradition And Commonsense In Admiralty, 14 Marq. L. Rev.
16, 17 (1929).
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torically established locality test." Those objecting to the locality
test offer as additional or alternative tests (1) that a vessel be involved
or (2) that the incident be of a maritime nature.
Vessels are felt to be necessary because "admiralty was the result of
commerce on the high seas, the commerce made possible by sailing
vessels. Just as vessels were the source of admiralty, they remain the
focal point of admiralty jurisdiction." 46 This view contends that the
locality test does not mean that "a tort or injury in no way connected
with any vessel, or its owner, officers, or crew, although occurring in
. . . [navigable waters] is for that reason within the jurisdiction of
the admiralty." 47 "Merely because events occur upon navigable waters
does not put them within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.
Transactions are 'maritime' only when in some way connected with a

'vessel'."

48

Nevertheless it has frequently been contended that pleasure boating,
which involves vessels, should not be within the admiralty jurisdiction.49 The word "vessel" is highly ambiguous and might include a
P 1
raft5 ° but not an ocean liner afloat but unfinished.
There is nothing
magic about the word "vessel" which assures that it is a proper
subject of maritime concern. There seems little reason why a collision
between two rafts should be in admiralty (under the maritime nature
test) any more than a collision between two bathers (under the locality
test), or why admiralty should concern itself with nonmaritime
events which take place on vessels, for example, dog bites 52 and
thefts. 83
A broader alternative to the locality test than vessel-involvement is
that of the maritime nature of the incident. "The fundamental principle underlying all cases of tort, as well as contract, is that, to
bring a case within the jurisdiction of a court of admiralty, maritime
relations of some sort must exist .... ,, 54 Thus viewed, admiralty
would extend to all torts arising out of maritime matters, whether
45

Bruncken, supra note 44, at 17.
46McGuire
v. City of New York, supra note 8, at 871.
47
Campbell v. H. Hackfeld & Co., 125 Fed. 696, 700 (9th Cir. 1903).
48
Robinson, Admiralty § 8 at 42 (1939).

49

Comment, 23 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 169 (1966).
50" 'The word "vessel" includes every description of water craft or other
artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation
on water."' Pleason v. Gulfport Shipbldg. Corp., 221 F.2d 621, 623 (5th Cir. 1955).
51
Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469 (1922); The Francis
McDonald,
254 U.S. 242 (1920).
52
The Lord Derby, 17 Fed. 265 (E.D. La. 1883).
53

The Minnetonka, 146 Fed. 509 (2d Cir. 1906).

54Campbell v. H. Hackfeld &Co., supra note 47, at 697.
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occurring on sea or land.55 England and France apply the maritime
nature test to determine admiralty jurisdiction and it has been contended that this is the most realistic test.5 6
The maritime nature test, however, creates the difficulty of a caseby-case determination of what is of a "maritime nature." 5 The difficulty of applying this test is well known in contract cases s and is
evidenced by the long established arbitrary principle that construction
of a vessel is not maritime in nature while repairing a vessel is maritime. 9 "[M]aritime transactions are inseparably connected with and
shade into the non-maridme" 00 and no satisfactory basis for distinguishing the 2 has been developed. If tort locality is no longer
to be considered, it is questionable how far inland the maritime nature
test should extend. 61 Thus while the locality test has been criticized,
there are also grounds for criticizing the suggested alternative tests.
Proper evaluation of these proposed tests or any test for admiralty
jurisdiction necessitates making a choice as to the purpose of an
admiralty jurisdiction. The logical validity of any test for admiralty
jurisdiction depends largely upon one's view of the purpose of admiralty. Even the supposedly irrational locality test can be justified
under at least 1 view of admiralty's purpose. Such a view contends that admiralty developed to handle the peculiar needs of the
maritime industry,6 2 and, taking a purely analytical approach, an obvious peculiarity of the maritime industry is that it is the only 1
involving transportation on water.63 "There can be nothing more
maritime than the sea" 6 and "the guide to admiralty jurisdiction must
be the needs of the sea or the needs of seagoing commerce." '5 Thus
if admiralty is based on the peculiar needs and hazards of the sea,
admiralty jurisdiction should extend to all actions arising from occurrences on the sea, and locality seems a logical test. Under the local'5"[AJ tort, arising as it does out of a maritime 'status' or 'relation', is
cognizable by the maritime law whether it arises on sea or on land." Strika v.
Netherlands Ministry Of Traffic, 185 F.2d 555, 558 (2d Cit. 1950).
GuMcGuire v. City of New York, supra note 8, at 867. See 25 Harv. L. Rev.
381 (1912).
57
Note, 16 Harv. L. Rev. 210, 211 (1903).
581bid.; 25 Harv. L. Rev. 381, 382-83 (1912).
GThe Francis McDonald, supra note 51.
0
OGilmore & Black, supranote 36, at 27.
O12Note, 75 U. Pa. L. Rev. 655, 658-59 (1927).
6 Gilmore & Black, supra note 36, at 11.

63Another obvious peculiarity of the maritime industry before the 19th
century
was that it was the only major means of bulk transportation.
4
O3'Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., supra note 14, at 763.
65McGuire v. City of New York, supra note 8, at 871.
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ity test an action arising from an aircraft crash in the sea, though not
involving a vessel or the maritime industry, would be within admiralty
jurisdiction because "when an aircraft crashes into navigable
waters, the dangers to persons and property are much the same as those
arising out of the sinking of a ship or a collision between two vessels." 66

Thus the locality test is logically sound under the view that admiralty's purpose is to deal with actions involving the peculiar needs
and hazards of the sea. The locality test is also simple and easy to
apply r and "the fact that in a few unusual instances the results
reached may be . . . [seemingly technical] is counterbalanced by the

fact that strict application of the test makes it possible to predict with
accuracy the results to be reached in a given case."188 The only difficult aspect of the locality test is determining where the tort was consummated, and a careful analysis of the facts will eliminate that difficulty.6 9 Careful analysis of the facts in Thomson reveals that the
injury, therefore the consummation of the tort, occurred on navigable
waters. Thug under a pure locality test Thomson was within admiralty
jurisdiction.
Though the locality test is not so irrational as some critics have
contended, its logical validity does hinge upon acceptance of the
view that the purpose of admiralty is to handle actions involving the
peculiar needs and hazards of navigable waters. However, such a
purpose for admiralty seems too narrow in view of the present highly
developed and complex maritime industry. A preferable purpose for
admiralty is to provide "orderly and uniform judicial governance of
the concerns of the maritime industry." 70 Such judicial governance
should be furnished by a separate system of admiralty courts7' with
06
Weinstein
8T

v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., supra note 14, at 763.
Note, 4 Texas L. Rev. 306, 315 (1926); Hough, Admiralty Jurisdiction-Of
Late Years, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 529, 533 (1924); Note, 54 Nw. U.L. Rev. 508,
510 (1959).

G8Note, 4 Texas L. Rev. 306, 315 (1926). "If the Court ... [hadlieft the
locality test intact and without qualifications there would be little doubt as to
when maritime law should be applied ... ." Note, 54 Nw. U.L. Rev. 508, 510
(1959).
09
Note, 4 Texas L. Rev. 306, 315 (1926).

7OBlack, supra note 44, at 262.
71Since the adoption of the Constitution, instance (non-prize) admiralty actions
in the United States have not been heard by a special court. Admiralty actions
are placed on a separate admiralty docket in 31 federal judicial districts; the
other 57 maintain no separate admiralty docket. Currie, The Silver Oar and All
That: A Study of the Romero Case, 27 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 7 (1959). However, it
frequently develops that almost all admiralty actions are heard by one judge
within the district and considerable expertise may already exist under the

